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VIGNETTES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW1
CHARLES C. ARAMo
I. Drunkenness as an Excuse for Murder
It required about ten days to secure a jury, largely because the
defense inquired whether or not each prospective juror would be
prejudiced against the defense of "moonshine madness." If a juror
would entertain any prejudice against a defense of "the insanity of
drunkenness from low-grade alcohol," he was not acceptable. The
defense inquired as follows, along this line-: "If the defendant is
able to show by competent evidence that at the time of the com-
mission of the alleged homicide the condition of his mind were such
that he did not know right from wrong and did not have the power
to choose the right and refrain from the wrong, he should not be
held accountable for his act. If that condition of the mind were
brought about by imbibing a low-grade alcohol, you will not refuse
to consider that insanity, simply because he voluntarily drank the
liquor. The law is to the effect that even if the defendant were at
fault in bringing about this condition, if the state of his mind were
such that you have a reasonable doubt as to whether he was sane or
insane, then, you should act upon that doubt and return a verdict
of not guilty, regardless of the cause." The question of law in
reference to drunkenness and insanity was explained to the jury in
the above manner in order to find out whether they were agreeable
to those laws. Questions were also asked for the purpose of finding
out the juror's attitude on the prohibition question. It was desirable
from the state's standpoint to secure reformers, ardent church-adher-
ents, model-men, strict law-enforcers, prohibitionists. On the other
band the defense wanted liberal-minded men, good fellows, at least
moderate drinkers, those who had been around saloons, and if pos-
sible, those who had actually experienced drunkenness. The attorney
in this type of case must be able to understand the state of mind of
the defendant to do the defense justice. He should be prepared to
live the scenes of the tragedy. He should seek to understand why
the defendant did the different acts attributed to him, to explain his
'The last contribution under this general title and by the same author
appeared in this JOURNAL, VoL. XXVI, 1, 1935.
2Member of the Chicago Bar.
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conduct before, during, and after the homicide. Deeds are com-
mitted when one is in this state that would never be committed in
normal periods. Some will fight upon the slightest provocation, Of-
fenses by those with whom they are in contact at the time are greatly
magnified and taken to heart. Reason is not in the saddle. The
nervous system is affected and the emotions run riot. The heart beat
is twenty to thirty pulsations per minute faster than normal. The
eyes are ablaze. The blood rushes through the veins. This internal
excitation will naturally bring about external manifestations of a
similar character. The victim loses his sense of proportion. He
gives vent to his feelings. He loses control of his reflexes and
equilibrium. He sways. His sense of egotism becomes unduly en-
larged. Anything may happen. The spirit of "I don't care,"
predominates. He looks only to the act, and disregards con-
sequences. He says foolish things and does foolish things. If one
of his acts results in a tragedy, when he learns of it, he may be a most
sorrowful person on account of it. Men have been known to slay
their own blood while in this state..
The facts in the case appeared to be as follows: The defendant
was a city policeman at the time of the commission of the homicide.
On this day he used his city star in securing liquor at different drink-
ing establishments. He ordered a taxi-cab to take him to several
road-houses after visiting various 1'laces within the city limits. Walk-
ing into the bar room in question he asked the proprietor to serve
him some liquor. The owner refused. - The defendant went into a
rage and swore profusely at him. The accused finally obtained his
drink from the bartender. The proprietor was approaching the bar
from the rear of his store. He held a glass of beer toward the de-
fendant and said, "Regards." The defendant drew his gun and said,
"I'll kill you, you Polack." Two shots were fired, one of them strik-
ing the wall, and the other penetrating the cheek of the victim. He
fell mortally wounded. The defendant was heard to say, "Is he
dead? If he isn't I'll shoot him again." Policemen were called to
the scene and the defendant was placed under arrest. Numerous
continuances had been granted in the case. The defendant was even
permitted bail, and he was out on bonds until one day during
the selection of the jury, his bondsmen surrendered him into cus-
tody. It was undoubtedly because of the defendant's drunkenness
at the time of his deed that the judge had agreed to permit the
defendant bail. From the extreme state of drunkenness the court
must have concluded that it was not an ordinary murder case. The
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evidence was not strong or the presumption of guilt great against the
accused. Otherwise, defendants charged with murder are not per-
mitted bail.
The taxi-cab driver who drove the accused to the scene of the
homicide, the bartender, and one or two others testified for the
state in reference to the conduct of the defendant and what he said
and did just before, during, and after the shooting. The defense
relied upon a doctor in a southern suburb of the city, a graduate of a
Swedish Medical School, for its proof of drunkenness, amounting to
insanity. He was a man about forty-five years of age, clean-shaven,
and spoke with a slightly Swedish accent. He testified that he ex-
amined the defendant twenty minutes after the shooting. He spoke
of the latter's condition. From this physical examination he reached
the conclusion that the accused was insane. In cross-examination,
the prosecutor would mention one of the symptoms which had in-
fluenced the doctor in reaching the conclusion of insanity. He would
then ask these questions: "Isn't that symptom found in a person
suffering from pyorrhoea, or some other physical ailment? Isn't that
symptom frequently found in persons who are perfectly sane? Isn't
that symptom often found in a person suffering from intoxication,
resulting from drinking high-grade alcohol? What is the distinction
bct-, een ordinary drunkenness and drunkenness from low-grade alco-
hol? How can you tell whether a man has become drunk from
ordinary alcohol or low-grade alcohol? Is there any difference in
the insanity resulting from drinking ordinary alcohol and the insan-
ity arising from drinking low-grade alcohol?" Next were called two
witnesses who testified as to the good reputation of the defendant
for peaceableness and quietude. One of these witnesses was not
neatly dressed and made a poor appearance. The defense then
rested its case. One of the state alienists was asked on rebuttal
whether or not the symptoms mentioned by the defense doctor were
not the possible symptoms of a man suffering from varlous physical
diseases; also, whether they were not the symptoms of those suffer-
ing from ordinary drunkenness caused by ordinary alcohol. In
cross-examination the defense brought out the fact that the witness
was receiving $100 per day for his participation in this lawsuit as
an assistant to the state's attorney. He had been present for three
days and expected to receive $300.00. He stated that he was not
receiving this money for testifying, but for his services as a profes-
sional man. Aside from this point, the cross-examination of the
doctor was futile. The defendant was not called to the stand.
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The first part of the defense final argument dealt with the sanc-
tity of the courtroom, the glory of the jury system, the attorney's proud
privilege to appear for a man whose liberty and life were in the bal-
ance, his high regard for his profession, and other matters of an intro-
ductory character. At this period he spoke at a distance of about
six feet from the jury rail. His left hand was at his side as he
gestured with the other. He spoke very rapidly, but clearly and
distinctly. In the course of these preliminary remarks, he stated, "I
will review this evidence in the best way that I can. I will make
no reference to any notes. I will give you the benefit of my analysis
of this evidence, to enable you to reach a just verdict in this case."
He referred to the defendant "as more than a client, my friend."
Toward the close of his address he turned to the defendant and said,
"Whatever the verdict in this case, George, I hope you feel that I
have done all in my power to make this jury see the light, and to
do justice toward you as I know it should be done."
The prosecutor replied, "I am a young man. I have not had the
experience of my worthy opponent. I am not an emotional speaker.
I cannot cope with the defending attorney either in speaking or
dramatics. I am not an actor. Tears do not as readily come into
my eyes as they do to his. All I will do is try to answer his argu-
ment in the best way that my humble ability permits. I will try to
talk logically to you, appealing neither to your sympathy nor to
your prejudice. Personally, I have nothing against the defendant.
I am here trying to do my duty as a public officer. I first want to
explain the law of this state in regard to drunkenness. I will sub-
mit the same case that the defending attorney used, to show you
that drunkenness is no excuse for crime. It is permitted to be shown
in any case, not because the state must show a specific intent to kill,
but because murder involves malice, a condition of the mind. It is
therefore allowed the defense to introduce evidence as to drunken-
ness, not as an excuse for the crime, but to throw some light on the
condition of his mind at the time of the alleged homicide. If you
found, therefore, that the drunkenness of the defendant so affected
his mind that you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not
he entertained malice aforethought, 'then you would not call his act
murder. But if you found that his act was the cause of an unlawful
killing, then, regardless of his drunkenness, he would be guilty of
manslaughter.
"Now, in regard to drunkenness in connection with insanity. If
you believe that the defendant was suffering from chronic alcohol-
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ism so that at the time of the commission of the homicide, the drink-
ing of alcohol had produced an insane mind, then, that insanity, like
any other insanity, is a complete excuse for crime. In that instance
the insanity is just as much an excuse as insanity from any other
cause. In connection with this matter, you are to take into con-
sideration the conduct of the defendant just before the commission
of the crime, in deciding whether or not at the time of the alleged
shooting the defendant knew right from wrong and had the power
of choosing between them. Unless you have a reasonable doubt as
to whether or not he had the ability to know right from wrong and
to choose between them you are to find that he had sufficient sanity
to make him accountable for his actions. From the fact that he
told the taxi-cab driver his objective, from the fact that he knew
where he was going, where he was at, that he acted as any normal
individual who wanted something, I contend that you are to conclude
that he was sane at the time that he was in that saloon. The
Supreme Court has stated in regard to this particular matter, that
before drunkenness can amount to an excuse for crime, it must have
caused a complete suspension of reason. The reason must have been
completely overcome. Unless you believe that the drunkenness of
this defendant had completely suspended his judgment at the time
of the shooting, you are not to consider that drunkenness as an
Lxcuse for the crime."
"You would think, from the argument of the defense in this
case, that our doctor was on trial, and not this defendant. When I
learned from the questions of the defending attorney in his examina-
tion of the jury that he was going to introduce the defense of in-
sanity I knew that I needed assistance and asked for this doctor to
help me in understanding the issues which were to be raised in this
lawsuit. It is true that the taxpayers of this county are going to
pay the doctor $300.00. Out of that same fund I am paid my meagre
salary. This doctor is not the ordinary witness. He is taken from
his chair at the University. He is taken from his practice. He is
entitled to be paid a reasonable fee for his services. You can judge
from the character and learning of the man whether or not he was
worth that money to the state. I will take the responsibility of
approving his bill. If you do not believe that he is worthy of that
payment, charge it personally to me. Any grievance that you may
have on that score you should direct toward me."
"Now as to the facts in this case, you have a policeman who is
supposed to honor and respect the law. In this case you have him
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violating the law at every turn. You sed him so bold and defiant
that he even commits murder and thinks he can get awty with it.
We find him starting on a spree in Chicago, going from place to
place to secure liquor. You find him aggrieved because the pro-
prietor of this inn refused his request for liquor, and when that
proprietor raises his glass of beer in token of good fellowship you
see the defendant make the declaration, 'I will kill you, you Polack
-!' The aim is sure. The gun is steady. The result is Death.
His victim didn't even-have a chance to say a prayer. That is the
kind of a case that you are considering."
"The doctor for the defense makes an examination of the de-
fendant a half hour after the alleged murder. He testified that at
that time the defendant was insane. But there is no testimony in
this case that the defendant was insane at the time of the shooting.
For that reason I did not ask our doctor whether or not, from all the
assumed facts and circumstance in this. case the defendant was
insane at the time of the shooting. That issue is not in this cse."
"I am not going to suggest to you what your finding should be.
You will be given several verdicts. If you find that the defendant
was insane at the time of the shooting, then sign that verdict. If
you believe that he was not insane but that his drunkenness elim-
inated the element of malice from the mind of the defendant, then
return a verdict of guilty of manslaughter. If you do not believe
that his drunkenness so interferfed with his reasoning processes so
as to take away the element of malice, then return a verdict of guilty
of murder and fix the penalty for any number of years not less than
fourteen. Do not send out the message that a man can become airunk,
go out and commit a heinous offense, and then be acquitted on ac-
count of his drunkenness. Do not return a verdict which will say
that ordinary drunkenness is a form of insanity which excuses a
man for the commission of his crime."
The jury, from the account in the newspaper, returned a verdict
of guilty on the first ballot. Seven of the jurors voted for the
death penalty, four of them for life, and one for fourteen years.
After about four hours of deliberation they agreed to fix the penalty
at thirty-five years.
